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Inter-Disciplinary Cooperation
and Information Sharing
Yaron Gottlieb*
In recent years, maritime piracy has reemerged as a
serious threat to the international community, particularly
following the significant increase in incidents of maritime piracy
and armed robbery at sea that occurred off the coast of Somalia
and in the Gulf of Guinea. As presented in this article,
international cooperation is indispensable for combating piracy.
To that end, the article argues that a duty to cooperate in the
repression of piracy is moored in various international
instruments—notably in Article 100 of the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—as well as in general principles
of international law. It requires states to adhere to due diligence
‘best efforts’ standards, which, in the context of maritime
piracy, entail exercising sincere, concerted, and proactive
efforts. The duty to cooperate should serve as a guiding
principle in identifying the specific obligations imposed on
states. Among those specific obligations is the duty to share
relevant information that can assist in preventing piracy attacks
and in facilitating prosecution of suspected pirates. It is further
submitted that successful undertakings to fight maritime piracy
necessitate inter-disciplinary cooperation, namely cooperation
among entities whose expertise generally lies in different fields.
The article further discusses the main challenges for information
sharing and proposes solutions to meet those challenges.
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I.

Introduction

In recent years, maritime piracy has reemerged as a serious threat
to the international community, notably following the significant
increase in incidents of maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea
that occurred off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Guinea. As
presented in this article, international cooperation is indispensable for
combating piracy. To that end, this article argues that a duty to
cooperate in the repression of piracy exists under international law.
This duty, as articulated in Article 100 of the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), should serve as a guiding principle in
identifying the specific obligations imposed on states. Among these
specific obligations is the duty to share relevant information that can
assist in preventing piracy attacks and in facilitating prosecution of
suspected pirates. It is further submitted that successful undertakings
to fight maritime piracy necessitate inter-disciplinary cooperation,
namely cooperation among entities with expertise in different fields.
This article further discusses the main challenges associated with
information sharing, and it proposes solutions to meet them.
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II. Combating Maritime Piracy:
The Duty to Cooperate
A. The Primary Legal Sources Underlying the Duty to Cooperate

Combating maritime piracy requires commitment and active
engagement by states. As indicated by Mr. Helmut Tuerk, the
honorable justice of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
“[t]he practice of piracy has been widespread over the centuries and
continues to be a menace. As a result, every State not only has a
right, but also a duty, to take action to curb piratical activities.”1
States are expected to take measures on both the domestic level—
for example, by criminalizing piratical acts2—and on the international
level. The key element of the latter is international cooperation,
whether directly among states or through the involvement of
international organizations and other mechanisms created by states.
Indeed, international instruments repeatedly refer to the
importance of international cooperation in the repression of maritime
piracy. Thus, for example, the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA
Convention”) provides in Article 13 that state parties shall cooperate
in the prevention of the offences defined by that convention.3

1.

Helmut Tuerk, Combating Terrorism at Sea—The Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 15 U. MIAMI
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 337, 342 (2008).

2.

See S.C. Res. 1918, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010)
(calling on “all States, including States in the region, to criminalize
piracy under their domestic law”). The UNSC reiterated this call in
later resolutions. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2077, para. 18, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/2077 (Nov. 21, 2012) (reiterating the call on “all States to
criminalize piracy under their domestic law”).

3.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation art. 13, opened for signature Mar. 10, 1988, 1678
U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter SUA
Convention]. Though the SUA Convention does not use the term
“piracy,” at least some of the offences listed in Article 3 of the
Convention such as the seizure of a ship by force are undoubtedly
applicable to piratical acts. See id. at 224. On the application of the
SUA Convention in the fight against maritime piracy see, inter alia,
Milena Sterio, Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia: The Argument for
Pirate Prosecutions in the National Courts of Kenya, the Seychelles,
and Mauritius, 4 AMSTERDAM L.F. 104, 121 (2012) (finding that “SUA
may prove to be a more useful model for the prosecution of pirates than
UNCLOS”); Cheah Wui Ling, Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance
in the Prosecution of Serious Maritime Crimes: A Comparative and
Critical Analysis of Applicable Frameworks 9–10, 13, HAGUE ACADEMY
RESEARCH SERIES (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2259753 (“The 1988 SUA is particularly noteworthy because it
addresses a number of cooperation issues that are encountered at sea.”).
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Similarly, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), in its series of
resolutions related to the threats of piracy and armed robbery at sea
off the coast of Somalia (and more recently in the Gulf of Guinea),
urged all states to cooperate with each other and with international
organizations in combating acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.4
The importance of international and regional cooperation in this
domain was also highlighted by the U.N. General Assembly in its
resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea.5
Notably, Article 100 of UNCLOS, titled “Duty to cooperate in the
repression of piracy,” specifies that “[a]ll States shall cooperate to the
fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in
any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”6
The duty to cooperate is at the core of the piracy section of
UNCLOS. Indeed, it is the first provision of this section, thereby
providing an appropriate benchmark as well as framework for the
substantive provisions that follow. Moreover, while international
cooperation is a common theme of UNCLOS,7 Article 100 is unique in
two ways. First, it is the only provision in UNCLOS in which the title
is the duty to cooperate.8 Secondly, it uses the strongest wording

4.

With regard to the situation in Somalia, see, for example, S.C. Res.
1816, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008). All UNSC
resolutions that followed on this matter highlighted the importance of
international cooperation. With regard to the situation in the Gulf of
Guinea, see S.C. Res. 2018, paras. 4, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2018 (Oct. 31,
2011); S.C. Res. 2039, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/2039 (Feb. 29, 2012).

5.

See G.A. Res. 63/111, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/111 (Dec. 5, 2008)
(“[The General Assembly] [r]ecognizes the crucial role of international
cooperation at the global, regional, subregional and bilateral levels in
combating, in accordance with international law, threats to maritime
security, including piracy, armed robbery at sea . . . .”). The General
Assembly reiterated this point in its annual resolutions on oceans and
the law of the sea. See G.A. Res. 66/231, ¶ 81, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/66/231 (Dec. 24, 2011); G.A. Res. 67/78, ¶ 88, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/67/78 (Dec. 11, 2012).

6.

U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 100, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994)
[hereinafter UNCLOS].

7.

See YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 4 (2012)
(explaining how international cooperation and spatial distribution of
national jurisdiction are the two basic functions of UNCLOS).

8.

Compare with other cooperation-related sections or provisions in
UNCLOS such as Section 2 (titled Global and Regional Co-operation) of
Part XII (Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment) or
Section 2 (titled “International Co-operation”) of Part XIII (Marine
Scientific Research). The titles of those provisions do not make a
specific reference to the “duty to cooperate.” UNCLOS, supra note 6,
1833 U.N.T.S. at 479, 496.
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found in UNCLOS with regard to this obligation; namely, that all
states shall cooperate “to the fullest possible extent.”9
Article 100 of UNCLOS contains the precise wording of Article 14
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (HSC),10 which in
turn incorporated (again, verbatim) the corresponding article adopted
by the International Law Commission (ILC) on the law of the sea.11
All of these provisions went beyond the proposal put together in the
scholarly work known as the Harvard Research Draft,12 which later
served as the basis for the discussions of piracy by the ILC and the
negotiations of the piracy provisions in the HSC. Article 18 of the
Harvard Research Draft provided that “[t]he parties to this
convention agree to make every expedient use of their powers to
prevent piracy, separately and in co-operation.” The commentary to
this provision underscored that Article 18 imposes on states only “a
general discretionary obligation to discourage piracy by exercising
their rights of prevention and punishment as far as is expedient.”13 By
establishing a duty to cooperate, UNCLOS and the HSC therefore
send a clearer message than originally foreseen in the proposal of the
Harvard Research Draft.
Both UNCLOS and HSC, however, did not set out the precise
obligations that fall within the scope of the general duty to
cooperate,14 thereby leaving this provision open to interpretation with
9.

UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 100, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 436 (emphasis
added). Compare with the wording of other UNCLOS provisions
mentioning that “States shall co-operate” (Articles 108 and 109) or
“should co-operate” (Article 123) or even “may co-operate” (e.g., Article
129). Other provisions provide that “States shall co-operate actively”
(Article 273) or refer to cooperation “to the extent possible” (Article
199). None of these therefore contain the clearest instruction on
cooperation as prescribed by Article 100. Id. at 437–38, 443, 479, 505.

10.

Convention on the High Seas art. 14, opened for signature Apr. 29,
1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30,
1962).

11.

Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
11 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 9, art. 38, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956),
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 253, 282, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1 [hereinafter 1956 ILC Report].

12.

Harvard Research in Int’l Law, Draft Convention on Piracy with
Comments, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 741 (1932); MYRA WILLIAMSON,
TERRORISM, WAR, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LEGALITY OF THE USE
OF FORCE AGAINST AFGHANISTAN IN 2001, at 95 (2009) (describing the
Harvard Research Draft as seminal because it comprehensively discussed
all angles of maritime piracy, which were later incorporated by the ILC
and HSC).

13.

Harvard Research in Int’l Law, supra note 12, at 746, 760.

14.

Compare to other sections of UNCLOS that specify the various areas
and means of cooperation such as Article 123 on cooperation of states
bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, or Article 143 on collaboration
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regard to the means that states should employ to sufficiently fulfill
their obligation. At the very least, however, it is evident that inaction
or failure to cooperate in response to piratical acts—where both the
factual circumstances and the applicable legal framework allow for
action and cooperation—cannot be reconciled with the duty as
prescribed by Article 100. The ILC, in its above commentary, clearly
stated that “[a]ny State having an opportunity of taking measures
against piracy, and neglecting to do so, would be failing in a duty laid
upon it by international law.”15 Similarly, Mr. Jack Lang, the Special
Adviser appointed by the U.N. Secretary General to address the legal
issues related to piracy off the coast of Somalia, underscored that the
degree of flexibility provided by the wording of Article 100 “should
not be used as a pretext for failure to prosecute.”16 Professor Rüdiger
Wolfrum, the honorable justice and former President of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, echoed this approach,
stating that “a ship entitled to intervene in cases of piracy may not,
without good justification, turn a blind eye to such acts.”17 Professor
Wolfrum went a step further by asserting that “[t]urning a blind eye
to the activities of pirates is in itself an act of piracy,”18 and by
suggesting that states permitting piracy activities may be subject to
countermeasures and also, theoretically, to an intervention by the
UNSC.19
B. Interpretation of the Duty to Cooperate: The Applicable Legal Test

Notwithstanding UNCLOS’ shortcomings in failing to detail the
specific obligations within the scope of the general duty to cooperate,
certain conclusions can be reached regarding the nature of the duty,
the applicable legal test, and the specific actions expected from states,
such as the duty to share relevant information.20

in the field of marine scientific research. UNCLOS, supra note 6, 1833
U.N.T.S. at 443, 448.
15.

1956 ILC Report, supra note 11, at 282.

16.

Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Annex Report to the Letter dated
Jan. 24, 2011 from the Secretary-General to the President of the
Security Council, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. S/2011/30 (Jan. 25, 2011) (by Jack
Lang).

17.

Rüdiger Wolfrum, Fighting Terrorism at Sea: Options and Limitations
Under International Law, ITLOS 4, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/
documents/statements_of_president/wolfrum/doherty_lectire_130406
_eng.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).

18.

Id. at 5.

19.

Id.

20.

See infra Part III and discussion on duty to share information.
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In this respect, Article 100 should be interpreted broadly. This
derives from the provision’s wording (duty to cooperate “to the fullest
possible extent”) as well as from the underlying rationale of the piracy
section of UNCLOS; namely, ensuring the international community’s
common interest in protecting the freedom of navigation and safety of
persons at sea.21
Further, while Article 100 does not create an absolute obligation,
its clear wording entails the existence of a presumption of cooperation
in the face of piracy. This presumption also derives from the general
principle of good faith in fulfilling treaty obligations, long recognized
as “[o]ne of the basic principles governing the creation and
performance of legal obligations, whatever their source . . . .”22 and
explicitly mentioned in UNCLOS.23 Thus, a state that was in a
position to act and failed to do so carries the burden of justifying—
based on factual, legal, or other grounds—its lack of action.
For the purpose of assessing compliance with the duty to
cooperate, this article proposes the application of the due diligence
principle. This fundamental principle of international law24 was used
as early as 1871,25 has been frequently applied in different fields such
21.

See DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA 38 (2009) (stating that “the rule against piracy exists to protect the
freedom of navigation and the safety of persons upon the high seas”).

22.

Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457, ¶ 49 (Dec. 20).
With regard to performing treaty obligations in good faith see also
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”). On
the principle of good faith in the context of international cooperation,
see Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, 396, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001),
reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 155, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 2001 ILC Report].

23.

UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 300, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 516 (“States Parties
shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention
and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this
Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of
right.”).

24.

Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., The Due Diligence Principle Under
International Law, 8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 81, 121 (2006) (quoting
Luigi Condorelli, The Imputability to States of Acts of International
Terrorism, 19 ISR. Y.B. H.R. 233, 240 (1989)).

25.

The 1871 Treaty of Washington mentioned due diligence in reference to
the responsibility of a neutral state for damages caused by private
individuals acting within its jurisdiction. See Treaty of Washington,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. VI, May 8, 1871, 17 Stat. 863, T.S. No. 133. A year
later, the treaty and this concept were subject to an international
arbitration (the Alabama Arbitration) between the U.S. and Great
Britain over the alleged failure of Great Britain to fulfill its duty of
neutrality during the American Civil War. See Alabama Claims of U.S.
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as environmental law, as well as invoked by international tribunals in
various cases.26 In some instances the principle has been mentioned in
an international instrument,27 yet an explicit reference is not required
as a precondition of utilizing it as the relevant standard. For example,
in its commentary to the Draft Articles on Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (“Draft Articles”),
the ILC often refers to this concept, even though it is not expressly
mentioned in the Draft Articles. Moreover, the ILC commentary to
the Draft Articles concluded that “[a]n obligation of due diligence as
the standard basis for the protection of the environment from harm
can be deduced from a number of international conventions.”28 As an
example of such a convention, the commentary mentions Article
194(1) of UNCLOS (“Measures to prevent, reduce, and control
pollution of the marine environment”), which does not expressly use
the term due diligence.29
The definition of this principle has been the subject of discussions
from the very early days of its existence.30 Maria Flemme proposed to
Against Great Britain (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), 29 R.I.A.A. 125, 131 (Treaty
of Washington Trib. Arb. 1872).
26.

See, e.g., Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment,
2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 101, 187 (Apr. 20) (calling for both parties to exercise
due diligence when taking measures to preserve the ecological balance of
the River Uruguay); Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area,
Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 11 ITLOS Rep. 10,
¶¶ 110–20 [hereinafter Responsibilities and Obligations Advisory
Opinion] (reiterating and explaining the principle of due diligence).

27.

For example, the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
provides in draft Article 7.1 (titled “Obligation not to cause significant
harm”) that “[w]atercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize
an international watercourse in such a way as not to cause significant
harm to other watercourse States.” Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. 10,
U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
1, 102, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2). See also
UNIDROIT, Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, art. 4(1) (June 24, 1995) (stipulating that a possessor of a
stolen cultural object has a right to restitution upon returning the
object if he/she proves, inter alia, the exercise of due diligence when
acquiring the object).

28.

2001 ILC Report, supra note 22, at 154 (citing commentary to Article 3
of the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from
Hazardous Activities).

29.

Id. at 154 n.880; UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 194, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 478.

30.

In the 1872 Alabama Arbitration, the parties to the dispute (the U.S.
and Great Britain) presented different definitions of the due diligence
concept as referred to in the 1871 Treaty of Washington. See Alabama
Claims, 29 R.I.A.A. at 129 (holding that due diligence should be
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view due diligence as signifying “the conduct to be expected of good
government in order to effectively protect other States and the global
environment.”31 She also suggested that the concept entails “a
minimum level of efforts which a State must undertake to fulfil [sic]
its international responsibilities.”32 In its commentary to Article 3 of
the Draft Articles, the ILC defined a higher threshold than Flemme’s
“minimum level of efforts,” namely that of “reasonable efforts.”33
Elsewhere, it has been suggested that “the due diligence obligation
requires the state’s best effort[s],”34 a position also reflected in the
Responsibilities and Obligations Advisory Opinion by the
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea.35
As indicated earlier in this article, UNCLOS uses the strongest
wording when referring to the duty to cooperate in the repression of
piracy (cooperation “to the fullest possible extent”). It is also
noteworthy that among the factors to be considered when determining
the applicable standard of due diligence are the specific risks
generated by the case or activity at hand.36 In that regard, it is
“exercised by neutral governments in exact proportion to the risks to
which either . . . may be exposed, from a failure to fulfill the obligations
of neutrality” after the parties in this suit presented different definitions
of the concept as referred to in the 1871 Treaty of Washington).
31.

Maria Flemme, Due Diligence in International Law, at 12 (Spring 2004)
(unpublished M. A. thesis) (on file with Lund University), available at
http://www. lunduniversity.lu.se/o.o.i.s?id=24965&postid=1557482.

32.

Id. at 1.

33.

2001 ILC Report, supra note 22, at 154 (“In the context of the present
articles, due diligence is manifested in reasonable efforts by a State to
inform itself of factual and legal components that relate foreseeably to a
contemplated procedure and to take appropriate measures, in timely
fashion, to address them.”).

34.

Barnidge, supra note 24, at 112 (quoting Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Reviewing
the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago’s Classification of Obligations of
Means and Obligations of Result in Relation to State Responsibility, 10
EUR. J. INT’L L. 371, 379 (1999)).

35.

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea concluded that “[t]he
sponsoring State’s obligation ‘to ensure’” is “an obligation to deploy
adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost, to
obtain this result.” Responsibilities and Obligations Advisory Opinion,
supra note 26, ¶ 110 (emphasis added).

36.

On the link between the applicable standard of due diligence and the
specific risks posed, see the Responsibilities and Obligations Advisory
Opinion, supra note 26, ¶ 117 (“The standard of due diligence has to be
more severe for the riskier activities.”). See also the ILC commentary on
its Draft Article 3 of the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, where it stated that
“[t]he required degree of care is proportional to the degree of hazard
involved.” 2001 ILC Report, supra note 22, at 155.
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indisputable that piracy presents serious risks to the international
community, as manifested, inter alia, by the unprecedented number
of UNSC resolutions adopted on the matter in a relatively short
period of time. Accordingly, in the counter-piracy field, the standard
of due diligence should be higher than minimum or even reasonable
efforts; rather, it should be based on the “best efforts” test. Stated
differently, compliance with Article 100 of UNCLOS would require
sincere, concerted, and proactive efforts to cooperate internationally
in the repression of maritime piracy.
As due diligence is a flexible concept,37 assessing its standard
requires analysis of not only the particular field of law, but also of the
specific obligation within the general duty to cooperate (such as the
duty to share information). Additionally, there is a need to consider
the facts and circumstances of each case. Indeed, the duty to
cooperate prescribed by Article 100 of UNCLOS may entail different
actions in different instances, also taking into consideration the tools
and resources available to the state in question. Thus, the
requirement for “sincere, concerted, and proactive efforts” should not
be perceived as defining a uniform, specific set of actions applicable to
all states in all situations. This conclusion corresponds to the position
expressed by the ILC in its commentary on the duty to cooperate in
combating piracy, which stated, “[o]bviously, the State must be
allowed a certain latitude as to the measures it should take to this
end in any individual case.”38 In addition, and similar to other fields
where the due diligence principle has been applied, it is clear that the
concept of due diligence implies an obligation of conduct, not of
result.39
37.

See the ILC Commentary to Article 2 of its Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, whereby it is
mentioned that standards such as due diligence “vary from one context
to another for reasons which essentially relate to the object and purpose
of the treaty provision or other rule giving rise to the primary
obligation.” 2001 ILC Report, supra note 22, at 34. See also
Responsibilities and Obligations Advisory Opinion, supra note 26, ¶ 117
(“The content of ‘due diligence’ obligations may not easily be described
in precise terms. Among the factors that make such a description
difficult is the fact that ‘due diligence’ is a variable concept.”); Flemme,
supra note 31, at 12 (“Flexibility is an essential characteristic of this
standard of conduct . . . .”).

38.

1956 ILC Report, supra note 11, at 282.

39.

See Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, supra note 27, at 103 (“The obligation of due diligence
contained in article 7 sets the threshold for lawful State activity. It is
not intended to guarantee that in utilizing an international watercourse
significant harm would not occur. It is an obligation of conduct, not an
obligation of result.”). See also Responsibilities and Obligations
Advisory Opinion, supra note 26, ¶ 110 (“The sponsoring State’s
obligation ‘to ensure’ is not an obligation to achieve, in each and every
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C. Article 100 as the Guiding Principle in Identifying the Specific Duties
Imposed on States

A detailed listing and in-depth discussion of all the specific duties
required pursuant to Article 100’s general obligation to cooperate
exceeds the scope of this article. For the purpose of the current
discussion, it is submitted that certain duties can be identified based
on a holistic interpretation of the piracy section of UNCLOS, which is
derived from a joint reading of Article 100 and the substantive
provisions of the piracy section. Stated differently, UNCLOS’ piracy
provisions should be interpreted and implemented in light of the
general guideline—namely the duty to cooperate—prescribed by
Article 100.
Thus, for example, a key provision under UNCLOS is Article 105,
which reads:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction
of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a
ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates,
and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The
courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide
upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the
action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property,
subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.40

Commentators have pointed to the hortatory characteristic of the
provision, notably due to the use of the verb “may” throughout this
article.41 It appears, however, that the use of the verb “may” does not

case, the result that the sponsored contractor complies with the
aforementioned obligations. Rather, it is an obligation to deploy
adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost, to
obtain this result. To utilize the terminology current in international
law, this obligation may be characterized as an obligation ‘of conduct’
and not ‘of result’, and as an obligation of ‘due diligence.’” (emphasis
added)).
40.

UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 105, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 437.

41.

GUILFOYLE, supra note 21, at 30–31 (“Under Article 105 of UNCLOS,
any state may seize a pirate vessel and its courts may ‘decide upon the
penalties to be imposed.’ This implies a permissive, not mandatory,
grant of universal jurisdiction and a choice of means as to how to
co-operate to suppress piracy.”); Tullio Treves, Piracy and the
International Law of the Sea, in MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES
AND RESPONSES 117, 122 (Douglas Guilfoyle ed., 2013) (“The language
of article 105 (i.e., ‘may’) seems to indicate that the exercise of
jurisdiction by the seizing state’s courts is a possibility, not an
obligation, notwithstanding the ‘duty’ to cooperate in the repression of
piracy set out in article 100.”); J. Ashley Roach, Countering Piracy Off
Somalia: International Law and International Institutions, 104 AM. J.
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imply the discretionary nature of the provision, but is rather meant to
indicate that the concrete actions listed under Article 105 are allowed
as an exception to the general principles that would otherwise forbid
them.
Accordingly, Article 105 permits the seizure of a pirate ship
navigating on the high seas as an exception to the general principle of
freedom of navigation on the high seas enshrined in UNCLOS,42 under
which such an intervention would have been considered illegal.
Similarly, Article 105 allows every state to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over pirates as an exception to the general principle
conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon the flag state.43
Thus, through the use of the term “may,” Article 105 sanctions
certain actions that would have otherwise been prohibited under
international law. This interpretation of the term “may” also
corresponds to the way it is used in other provisions in UNCLOS’
piracy section. An example of this is Article 107, which provides that
“[a] seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships
or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and
identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that
effect.”44 As manifested by the title of the provision (“Ships and
aircraft which are entitled to seize on account of piracy”),45 the use of
the term “may” in this article indicates which vessels or aircrafts are
allowed to conduct the seizure, rather than whether states have the
discretion or an obligation to carry out such acts.
Consequently, the use of the term “may” in these provisions does
not imply that a state has complete discretion over whether to act.
Indeed, this is precisely where the link to Article 100 becomes
relevant. If a state is in a position to seize a pirate ship or take other
INT’L L. 397, 403 (2010) (“[Article 105], like all of the piracy provisions
save Article 100, is discretionary—‘may’ . . . .”).
42.

UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 87(1)(a), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 432.

43.

See id. art. 92(1), at 433 (“Ships shall sail under the flag of one State
only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in
international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its
exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.”). See also M/V Saiga (No. 2)
(St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Judgment of July 1, 1999, 3 ITLOS
Rep. 10, 48 (“[T]he ship, every thing on it, and every person involved or
interested in its operations are treated as an entity linked to the flag
State.”); Medvedyev v. France, Judgment of Mar. 29, 2010, para. 85
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/
pdf/001-97979?TID=ufyxypubrf (mentioning the principle of universal
jurisdiction over piracy acts as an exception to the rule of the exclusive
jurisdiction of the flag state); TANAKA, supra note 7, at 152–55.

44.

UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 107, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 437 (emphasis
added).

45.

Id. (emphasis added).
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actions sanctioned by Article 105, and it nonetheless chooses not to
act, for example, due to reasons of political convenience, it can
certainly be argued that this state did not fulfill its obligations under
international law. More specifically, it can be argued that the state
failed to fulfill its obligation to cooperate in the suppression of piracy
under Article 100.46 To be clear, the combination of Articles 100 and
105 does not create an obligation to seize a pirate ship under all
circumstances. Yet the state concerned should present a sound
explanation for its lack of action in light of the presumption of
cooperation and the due diligence standard created by Article 100. To
that end, an attempt to rely on the term “may” in Article 105 as
allegedly pointing to the hortatory nature of the provision does not
appear to be convincing and might put into question the state’s good
faith in raising such an argument.
Article 100 can further serve as a benchmark to construe the
piracy provisions in case a doubt arises on the appropriate
interpretation. One example already mentioned in the literature on
piracy concerns the practice of naval forces operating off the coast of
Somalia to hand over suspected pirates to regional states such as
Kenya to face trial. Article 105 provides neither explicit authority to
do so, nor does it expressly prohibit such cooperation between the
arresting state and the prosecuting one. In response to the argument
that in accordance with Article 105 only the arresting state has
jurisdiction to try the pirate,47 it has been correctly contended that
such an argument “is inconsistent with the strong duty of cooperation
46.

A similar position (though without explicitly referring to a violation of a
duty under international law) can be found in Professor Wolfrum’s
discussion of Article 107 of UNCLOS, where he stated that “[i]t has to
be acknowledged that the central provision, namely article 107 of the
Convention, is worded as an option for States to take up rather than as
an obligation incumbent upon them. However, States are under an
obligation to cooperate in the repression of piracy (article 100 of the
Convention). Reading article 100 and 107 of the Convention together, it
can be argued that States may not lightly decline to intervene against
acts of piracy.” Wolfrum, supra note 17, at 3–4. A different position was
expressed by John Kavanagh, who argued that “a state’s
non-compliance with the provision [Article 100] would not constitute a
breach of international law. In other words, a state could avoid the
prosecution of a pirate who is within its jurisdiction or avoid the
enactment of legislation to provide for prosecution.” John Kavanagh,
The Law of Contemporary Sea Piracy, 1999 AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 127, 140–
41 (referring to BARRY H. DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA
PIRACY 108 (1980)).

47.

See Eugene Kontorovich, United States v. Shi. 525 F.3d 709, Cert.
Denied, 129 S.Ct. 324 (2008) United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, April 24, 2008, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 734, 739 (2009)
(noting that transfer might be illegal under UNCLOS because it only
allows capturing nations to prosecute pirates).
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in the international law of piracy articulated by Article 100. The
practice of states reflected in their arrangements with Kenya indicates
that they believe cooperation includes transfers ashore to third states
for trial and that they are permitted under international law.”48
Finally, Article 100 can also be invoked to support counter-piracy
initiatives in accordance with states’ national legislation. For example,
it has been reported that the Netherlands uses this provision as the
legal basis for its authorization of Vessel Protection Detachments
(VPDs) on Dutch ships under its Constitution.49

III. The Duty to Share Information as a Specific
Obligation Under the General
Duty to Cooperate
The concrete measures to be applied by states as part of their
general duty to cooperate are determined based on the characteristics
of the particular threat and the circumstances of each case. Whatever
the specific measures are, however, there should be little doubt that
48.

Roach, supra note 41, at 404 (countering Eugene Kontorovich’s position
that expresses a more restricted reading of Article 105). A conclusion
similar to that of Roach—though without basing it on Article 100—was
presented by Lawrence Azubuike, who also countered Kontorovich’s
position by arguing that “[n]othing on the face of the Article [105]
makes the jurisdiction exclusive to the arresting State.” Lawrence
Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN. SURV.
INT’L & COMP. L. 43, 54–55 (2009). An opinion similar to that of
Kontorovich was presented by Joseph M. Isanga. To support their
position, both Kontorovich and Isanga pointed to the commentary to
Article 43 of the ILC Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea (which is
the equivalent to Article 105 of UNCLOS). See Joseph M. Isanga,
Countering Persistent
Contemporary Sea
Piracy:
Expanding
Jurisdictional Regimes, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (2010) (finding
that UNCLOS does not extend universal jurisdiction to cases involving
extradition). The ILC commentary reads: “This article gives any State
the right to seize pirate ships (and ships seized by pirates) and to have
them adjudicated upon by its courts. This right cannot be exercised at a
place under the jurisdiction of another State.” 1956 ILC Report, supra
note 11, at 283. As indicated, this author supports the position
expressed by Roach and Azubuike in light of the importance attached to
international cooperation in combating piracy as provided for by
Article 100 of UNCLOS. A conclusion supporting broad interpretation
of Article 105 (and the rest of the piracy provisions) can also be deduced
from the object and purpose of the piracy section of UNCLOS, namely
the common interest of the international community in ensuring the
freedom of navigation and the safety of persons and property upon the
high seas.

49.

See Clive R. Symmons, Embarking Vessel Protection Detachments and
Private Armed Guards on Board Commercial Vessels: International
Legal Consequences and Problems Under the Law of the Sea, 51 MIL. L.
& L. WAR REV. 21, 33 n.51 (2012).
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information exchange is vital to ensure successful international
cooperation in counter-piracy operations.
Indeed, the duty to share information can be identified as a
particular obligation within the general duty to cooperate. This
conclusion is supported by relevant international instruments. For
example, the SUA Convention provides that “States Parties shall
co-operate in the prevention of the offences set forth in article 3,
particularly by . . . exchanging information in accordance with their
national law . . . .”50
As explained by Justice Tuerk in reference to that provision:
“there is a duty for States Parties that have a reason to believe that
an offense set forth in the [SUA] Convention will be committed to
furnish as promptly as possible any relevant information to those
States having established jurisdiction over such offenses.”51
In addition, the UNSC resolutions related to the suppression of
piracy and armed robbery at sea also urge all states to share
information on acts related to piracy and armed robbery at sea.52 The
U.N. General Assembly has also emphasized the importance of
information sharing as part of international cooperation in addressing
the problem of piracy.53
On the regional level, the need for information sharing as a means
of promoting cooperation in the suppression of piracy was a prime
motivator for Asian states in adopting the Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships

50.

SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 13.1(b), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 230–31.

51.

Tuerk, supra note 1, at 349.

52.

See S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 4, ¶ 3 (“Urg[ing] all States to cooperate
with each other . . . and share information about, acts of piracy and
armed robbery in the territorial waters and on the high seas off the
coast of Somalia . . . .”). The UNSC reiterated the importance of
sharing information in other resolutions as well. See, e.g., S.C. Res.
1846, para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1976,
para. 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (Apr. 11, 2011). In more recent
Resolutions, the UNSC explicitly highlighted the importance of sharing
evidence and information among states and international organizations
for anti-piracy law enforcement purposes including with regard to the
key figures of the criminal networks involved in piracy. See, e.g.,
S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 2, ¶ 9.

53.

See G.A. Res. 63/111, supra note 5, ¶ 61 (“[The General Assembly]
[r]ecognizes the crucial role of international cooperation at the global,
regional, subregional and bilateral levels in combating, in accordance
with international law, threats to maritime security, including piracy,
armed robbery at sea . . . through . . . the enhanced sharing of
information among States relevant to the detection, prevention and
suppression of such threats . . . .”). See also G.A. Res. 66/231, supra
note 5, ¶ 81; G.A. Res. 67/78, supra note 5, ¶ 88.
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in Asia (ReCAAP).54 A key feature of ReCAAP is the creation of an
information sharing center, based in Singapore, whose role is to
undertake the collection, collation, and analysis of information
received from state parties and to ensure a flow of information
between them.55 Similarly, the more recent sub-regional Codes of
Conduct, adopted in 2009 in Djibouti56 and in 2013 in Cameroon,57
both inspired by ReCAAP,58 each provide that cooperation among the
state parties shall include “sharing and reporting relevant
information.”59 The Codes of Conduct further provide for detailed
obligations related to information sharing, such as the need to
designate a national focal point to facilitate coordinated, timely, and
effective flow of information.60
The duty to exchange information related to the prevention and
suppression of maritime piracy may also derive independently from
the abovementioned principle of due diligence. This concept entails,
inter alia, that states have a responsibility to forewarn other countries
about potential threats by communicating relevant information and
updating international police databases in a systematic and
comprehensive fashion.61 The “responsibility to forewarn” is not a new
54.

NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY
(Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2011).

55.

Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships in Asia art. 7, Nov. 11, 2004, 2398 U.N.T.S. 199
(entered into force Sept. 4, 2006); KLEIN, supra note 54, at 242−43.

56.

Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression
of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti Meeting Res. 1 (Jan. 29, 2009)
[hereinafter Djibouti Code of Conduct], available at http://www.imo.
org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/DCoC%20English.pdf.

57.

Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] et al., Code of
Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against
Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa (June
25, 2013) [hereinafter Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct], available at
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/maritime_security/code_of_co
nduct.pdf.

58.

See Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 56, pmbl. The Gulf of Guinea
Code of Conduct was in turn, inspired by the Djibouti Code of Conduct.
See Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct, supra note 57, pmbl.

59.

Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 56, art. 2(1); Gulf of Guinea Code
of Conduct, supra note 57, art. 2(1).

60.

See Djbouti Code of Conduct, supra note 56, art. 8 (“Coordination and
Information Sharing”); see Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct, supra note
57, art 11 (same).

61.

See RUTSEL SILVESTRE J. MARTHA, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERPOL 26−28 (2010); see also Ronald K. Nobel, INTERPOL
Secretary General, Prosecuting Terrorism: The Global Challenge,
Keynote Address Organized by NYU Center on Law & Security (June 4,
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notion under international law. For example, in the Corfu Channel
case, the International Court of Justice pointed to the duty of states
to notify and warn countries of an imminent danger based on certain
general and well-recognized principles such as elementary
considerations of humanity.62
With the Corfu Channel case in mind,63 the obligation to forewarn
was introduced into UNCLOS, where it is provided in Article 24(2)
that “[t]he coastal State shall give appropriate publicity to any danger
to navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its territorial sea.”64
It would be reasonable to contend that activities of a piratical nature
pose a “danger to navigation” within the meaning of Article 24(2),
thereby requiring the coastal state to warn other states of such known
activity in its territorial waters. Beyond the territorial sea, the duty
to forewarn is a corollary obligation of the duty to cooperate
enshrined in Article 100 of UNCLOS, and by other relevant
instruments, such as the SUA Convention and the abovementioned
UNSC resolutions.

IV. The Nature of Cooperation: A Call for Holistic
Inter-Disciplinary Cooperation
Having established the existence of a general duty to cooperate
and to share information, consideration should be given to the nature
of the required cooperation in combating maritime piracy. Specifically,
this article proposes a departure from the traditional concepts related
to crime prevention in favor of adopting a holistic, inter-disciplinary
paradigm for cooperation.

2004), available at http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/speeches/
SG20040604.asp (“Countries have a responsibility to forewarn other
countries about individuals that present a potential threat. . . . The
practical implication is that countries have to ensure that they
communicate all potentially relevant information to other countries and
update international police databases in a systematic and comprehensive
fashion.”). In the context of combating terrorism, the duty to forewarn
of imminent threats was underscored by the UNSC in Resolution 1373,
where the USNC, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
decided that all states shall “[t]ake the necessary steps to prevent the
commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to
other States by exchange of information.” S.C. Res. 1373, para. 2(b),
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
62.

Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9);
MARTHA, supra note 61, at 27.

63.

See TANAKA, supra note 7, at 96 (stating that Article 24(2) of UNCLOS
incorporated the dictum from the Corfu Channel case regarding the
duty to warn).

64.

UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 24(2), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407.
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Traditionally, governmental authorities and international entities
operating in different fields have carried out their missions virtually
independently of each other: the police engage in purely police work,
the military engage in purely military operations, and so on. In
addition, the level of cooperation between such bodies and the private
sector has frequently been insignificant, if not practically non-existent.
This traditional paradigm may work effectively when combating
classic forms of crime such as land-based murder, robbery, and theft.
Nonetheless, the challenges that have accompanied relatively new
forms of crime such as terrorism, or the “resurrection” of old crimes
such as maritime piracy, have highlighted the shortcomings of this
conventional approach.
This shift in the risks posed to our societies necessitates
adjustment on two levels. First, substantive changes are necessary,
namely with regard to the type of tasks carried out by each actor.
Thus, for example, military forces might be requested to engage in
activities of a law enforcement nature, and police forces might be
asked to investigate illegal activities which, in the past, have not been
considered “typical” ordinary law crimes in the strict sense of that
term.
Second, and stemming also from these substantive changes,
institutional—or, more precisely, inter-institutional—adjustments are
required. Concretely, there is a need to involve all relevant actors in
this process—hence, the call for a holistic approach—and to establish
cooperation among agencies and institutions whose role, mandate, and
general activities may often be significantly different from one
another. Enabling and coordinating the interaction between such
bodies, namely inter-disciplinary cooperation, is not only desirable,
but is in fact imperative.
The “holistic inter-disciplinary cooperation” paradigm is of
particular relevance in the field of maritime piracy. Despite the fact
that piracy is a classic crime, its geographic location requires the
involvement of naval forces. In addition, the shipping industry is often
in possession of valuable information that can be used for criminal
investigations and prosecutions. Thus, there is clearly a need to
establish collaboration among navies, law enforcement agencies, and
the private sector. As will be discussed in the next section, such
collaboration is not without challenges, yet it remains essential to
successful counter-piracy undertakings.

V. Challenges in Sharing Information in the Fight
Against Piracy
Sharing relevant information among states and international
organizations is vital for combating piracy and should therefore be
applied as the general standard procedure. Information exchange
nonetheless faces a number of difficulties that will be addressed below.
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A. Scope of the Duty to Share Information and the
“National Security” Exception

Frequently, the international instruments applicable to the
suppression of piracy do not shed much light on the precise scope of
the duty to share information. As already noted in this article, the
duty to share information in reference to piracy is not explicitly
mentioned in Article 100 of UNCLOS (or elsewhere in the piracy
section).65 In the SUA Convention, the need to share information is
mentioned, yet without further details.66
Consequently, states are left to decide what precise information
should be shared, how it is to be transmitted, and when it is to be
delivered.67 Moreover, even when more detail on the duty to share
information is provided, restrictions are often imposed due to national
security, sovereignty, or commercial confidentiality concerns.68 Such
restrictions are found in the SUA Convention (exchange of
information “in accordance with national law”69), as well as in
Article 302 of UNCLOS, a general provision concerning the disclosure
of information: “[N]othing in this Convention shall be deemed to
require a State Party, in the fulfilment of its obligations under this
Convention, to supply information the disclosure of which is contrary
to the essential interests of its security.”70
These restrictions—in particular, those based on the “national
security” argument—can be used by states to justify their decision
not to share information.71 Nonetheless, it is submitted that the
implementation of laws and regulations that prevent or restrict the
exchange of information should be done only as an exception to the
general obligation to share information deriving from Article 100 and
the due diligence principle. Thus, if a state possesses relevant data,
65.

Compare id. art. 100, at 436, with id. art. 200, at 480 (according to
which states shall cooperate through the exchange of information and
data acquired about pollution of the marine environment).

66.

See SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 13(b), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 230–31
(“State Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the offences set
forth in article 3, particularly by . . . exchanging information in
accordance with their national law, and co-ordinating administrative
and other measures taken as appropriate to prevent the commission of
offences set forth in article 3.”).

67.

See KLEIN, supra note 54, at 255 (finding that in the law enforcement
context, states often agree to no more than a duty to cooperate, leaving
the specifics of the duty to states’ discretion).

68.

Id. at 255–56.

69.

SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 13(b), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 230–31.

70.

UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 302, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 516.

71.

See KLEIN, supra note 54, at 254 (mentioning the problem of national
security interests trumping international security interests).
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and it neglects—or even refuses—to share it, it carries the burden of
justifying such a position.
This approach is grounded in the wording of provisions such as
the abovementioned Article 302 of UNCLOS, which allows
non-disclosure of information only for purposes of protecting
“essential interests of [state] security.”72 It is further based on the
fundamental principle under international law requiring states to
fulfill their obligations in good faith. Indeed, if, as a matter of policy,
a state refrains from sharing information related to the prevention
and suppression of maritime piracy, it can hardly be argued that it
fulfills its obligation to cooperate in good faith.
This conclusion is further supported by the nature of piracy as, in
essence, an ordinary law crime. Accordingly, the type of information
whose sharing is of importance for the purpose of combating maritime
piracy would typically be that which is exchanged as a standard
procedure among law enforcement authorities when countering crime:
identification of suspects, modus operandi, etc. Thus, in general, the
sharing of such information between the entities involved in
counter-piracy operations (whether the navies or law enforcement
agencies) is unlikely to compromise national security. It should
therefore not be surprising that at least among law enforcement
agencies and based on INTERPOL’s practice following the creation of
its Global Maritime Piracy Database,73 in the domain of maritime
piracy, very few restrictions have been imposed by INTERPOL’s
member countries on information exchanged via the INTERPOL
information system.74 As described in the next section, however, the
72.

UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 302, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 516 (emphasis
added).

73.

INTERPOL’s Global Piracy Database was created in 2011 and was
mentioned in UNSC Resolutions such as Resolution 2020. S.C. Res.
2020, para. 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011) (“[The Security
Council] [c]ommends INTERPOL for the creation of a global piracy
database designed to consolidate information about piracy off the coast
of Somalia and facilitate the development of actionable analysis for law
enforcement, and urges all States to share such information with
INTERPOL for use in the database, through appropriate channels.”).
As of July 2013, the database contains information on piracy events,
pirates’ weapons, bank accounts, suspected financiers, negotiators, and
more. For further information on the database, see Pierre St. Hilaire,
Somali Piracy: Following the Paper Trail 6–7 n.4 (June 2012) (on file
with the United Arab Emirates Counter Piracy Conference), available at
http://www.counterpiracy.ae/2012-briefing-papers.

74.

In accordance with INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data
(RPD), the source of data that circulated via INTERPOL’s channels
retains control over its data. INTERPOL, Rules on the Processing of
Data, art. 7(1), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/
dataprotection/tpd_documents/R%C3%A8glement%20INTERPOL_en.
pdf. This includes, inter alia, the right to impose restrictions on the
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flow of information between the navies and law enforcement entities is
not without difficulties.
B. Challenges Deriving from the Nature of the Crime and the Entities
Involved in Counter-Piracy Operations
1. Navies carrying out law enforcement activities

Since piracy takes place on the high seas, and often very far from
the shore, combating piratical acts requires more than the typical
police-prosecution cooperation, which is predominant in land-based
ordinary law crimes such as theft or robbery. Notably, it calls for the
involvement of navies as the front-line entities that both prevent
attacks and gather relevant information to facilitate prosecution. In
fact, in such operations, the navies exercise activities of a law
enforcement nature. This unique feature in combating maritime
piracy creates certain problems including those related to information
exchange.
The lead role taken by navies in combating piracy has also led the
international community to overlook the role of law enforcement
organizations and agencies, particularly during the early stages of
combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. Thus, despite the fact that
by the end of 2008 a shift towards a law enforcement paradigm was
already underway,75 it was not until late November 2010 that the
UNSC—already in its eleventh resolution related to piracy off the
coast of Somalia76—made a clear reference to organizations such as
INTERPOL and Europol operating in the counter-piracy field.
In Resolution 1950, the UNSC underlined the importance of
continuing to enhance the collection, preservation, and transmission of
evidence of acts of piracy to competent authorities; welcomed the
access or the use of such data by other users of the system, namely by
other countries or international entities. Id. arts. 7(1), 58.
75.

Douglas Guilfoyle, Piracy off Somalia and Counter-Piracy Efforts, in
MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra note 41, 35,
50–51.

76.

The first UNSC Resolution making a reference to the threats posed by
maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia was UNSC Resolution 1676.
See S.C. Res. 1676, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1676 (May 10, 2006). The UNSC
reiterated its concerns over piratical incidents in Resolution 1772. See
S.C. Res. 1772, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1772 (Aug. 20, 2007); S.C. Res. 1801,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1801 (Feb. 20, 2008). The first time the UNSC
addressed piracy off the coast of Somalia as the primary subject matter
of a resolution was in June 2008, when it adopted Resolution 1816. See
S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 4. That resolution was followed by the
following resolutions adopted by November 2010: S.C. Res 1838, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 52; S.C. Res.
1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008), S.C. Res. 1897, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); and S.C. Res. 1918, supra note 2.
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ongoing work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO),
INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on
preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy; and urged states,
in cooperation with INTERPOL and Europol, to further investigate
international criminal networks involved in piracy off the coast of
Somalia, including those responsible for illicit financing and
facilitation.77 This rather late inclusion of the law enforcement angle
in UNSC resolutions (and elsewhere) was particularly surprising,
given that the guidelines for involving police forces in combating
maritime piracy had already been put in place when the situation off
the coast of Somalia began to deteriorate.78
By not considering the potential in engaging the law enforcement
community, a number of difficulties have emerged, particularly with
regard to facilitating the prosecution of pirates, a task that typically
falls within the expertise of law enforcement agencies. Naval forces do
not necessarily have the tools or the expertise to gather and preserve
the relevant evidence necessary for criminal proceedings.79 In addition,
they generally do not have criminal databases where important data
such as personal information on suspects, fingerprints, and DNA can
be stored and compared with existing data. Such expertise and tools
are at the core of law enforcement activities and international police
cooperation. The relative lack of involvement of the police in those
early stages therefore created a gap, or a “missing link,” between the
navies operating off the coast of Somalia and the prosecution services.
The growing recognition of the need to engage all relevant actors,
including the law enforcement community, as part of the holistic
interdisciplinary paradigm, led to welcome changes in the mindset
that guided the international community in the early stages of
combating piracy off the coast of Somalia.
Thus, in addition to the abovementioned UNSC Resolution 1950,
three noteworthy examples of the positive shift in approach are found
in the following instruments. First, in UNSC Resolution 1976, the
77.

See S.C. Res. 1950, para. 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010).

78.

See, e.g., Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Code of Practice for the
Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 922 (22) (Nov. 29, 2001). Among the
points included in that Code were the following: involve relevant
organizations (e.g., INTERPOL) at an early stage; evidence
accumulated from different cases may create opportunities to identify
offenders; appropriate databases should be searched; and contacting
INTERPOL for information on the offenders (e.g., prior convictions) is
important. Id. ¶¶ 5.6, 7.16.

79.

See Håkan Friman & Jens Lindborg, Initiating Criminal Proceedings
with Military Force: Some Legal Aspects of Policing Somali Pirates by
Navies, in MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra
note 41, at 172, 195.
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UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter: (1) invited
states, individually or in cooperation with regional organizations,
UNODC, and INTERPOL, to examine domestic procedures for the
preservation of evidence and assist Somalia and other states in the
region in strengthening their counter-piracy law enforcement
capacities; (2) underlined the importance of continuing to enhance the
collection, preservation, and transmission of evidence to competent
authorities; and (3) urged states and international organizations to
share evidence and information for anti-piracy law enforcement
purposes with a view to ensuring effective prosecution.80 UNSC
Resolution 2020 further highlighted the importance of sharing
information with INTERPOL and Europol, including for the purposes
of investigating those responsible for illicit financing and facilitation.81
The second example is the amendment to the 2008 European
Union Council Decision on Operation Atalanta, which is the
European Union military operation off the coast of Somalia. The
amended framework explicitly instructs Operation Atalanta to:
(1) collect data including characteristics likely to assist in
identification of piracy suspects such as fingerprints; and (2) circulate,
via INTERPOL’s channels, and check against INTERPOL’s
databases, personal data concerning suspects, including fingerprints
and other identifiers (e.g., name, DOB, etc.).82
A third example concerns the updates introduced in the fourth
version of the Best Management Practices for Protection Against
Somalia Based Piracy (BMP4). In the BMP4, produced and
supported by a number of prominent players in the civil industry and
naval forces, a specific chapter was added on cooperation with law
enforcement authorities.83
These three examples illustrate a positive shift in the strategic
view of counter-piracy undertakings. Yet, certain complexities related
to the exchange of information between navies and law enforcement
entities had to be addressed. First, as a matter of normal procedure,
navies tend to designate the data they collect as “classified
information.” This poses serious impediments with regard to the use
of such data for the purpose of prosecution on the national level, as
well as in the context of international collaboration with entities
(i.e., countries or international organizations) that generally do not
80.

S.C. Res. 1976, supra note 52, ¶¶ 16, 18, 19.

81.

S.C. Res. 2020, supra note 73, ¶ 18.

82.

See Council Decision 2010/766/CFSP, art. 1, 2010 O.J. (L 327) 49, 50
(EU).

83.

BMP 4: BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST
SOMALI BASED PIRACY, § 12 (2011) [hereinafter BMP4], available at
http://www.mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4_low_res_sep_5
_2011.pdf (referring to the section titled “Post Incident Reporting”).
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have access to classified information. As an example from
INTERPOL’s practice, this issue had to be addressed during the
discussions that led to the conclusion of a pilot agreement on
information sharing between NATO and INTERPOL.84
To address this concern, it is submitted that while the
implementation of classified information rules is justified in the
operations of navies during wartime or in preparation for military
activities, a different approach should govern the operations of naval
forces when carrying out missions of a law enforcement nature such as
counter-piracy activities. Thus, applying standard navy classification
procedures in this context, and consequently withholding from
law-enforcement agencies important information such as fingerprints
of suspected pirates, can hardly serve the original purpose of classified
information. Further, it does not correspond to the general obligation
to share information in combating maritime piracy. Piracy-related
information either should not be designated as “classified information”
in the first place, or it should be declassified as standard procedure.
Sharing information in the other direction, specifically from law
enforcement entities to the navies, also posed certain challenges. For
example, in the context of INTERPOL’s work, a question arose
whether INTERPOL may cooperate with navies considering Article 3
of its Constitution, according to which “[i]t is strictly forbidden for
the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a
political, military, religious or racial character.”85 A plain reading of
this provision could have led to the conclusion that INTERPOL must
not share any information with the navies or organizations that
operate off the coast of Somalia, such as NATO. INTERPOL
nonetheless concluded that as long as the purpose and nature of the
collaboration is confined to promoting international police
cooperation, Article 3 does not prevent it from doing so.86 Based on
84.

See INTERPOL and NATO Cooperation Set to Boost Global Efforts
Against
Maritime
Piracy,
INTERPOL
(Oct.
6,
2012),
http://www.interpol.int/en/Internet/News-and-media/News-mediareleases/2012/N20121006. INTERPOL also provided specialized training
for the crew of naval vessels ahead of their deployment under the NATO
anti-piracy mission, Operation Ocean Shield. See INTERPOL Training
Supports NATO Anti-Piracy Mission, INTERPOL (Oct. 12, 2013),
http://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-media/News-media-releases/
2013/N20131012/.

85.

INTERPOL, Constit. art. 3 (June 13, 1956), available at http://www.
interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/The-Constitution.

86.

For further discussion of Article 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution and
specifically on the application of the “purpose and nature” test in the
field of maritime piracy, see Yaron Gottlieb, Article 3 of INTERPOLS’s
Constitution: Balancing International Police Cooperation with the
Prohibition on Engaging in Political, Military, Religious, or Racial
Activities, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 135, 183–84 (2011).
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this functional interpretation of Article 3, which permits in principle
the flow of data from INTERPOL to the naval forces,87 INTERPOL
shared information with the navies deployed in the Indian Ocean,
such as a photo album of suspected pirates. The information
contained in the photo album, gathered by INTERPOL from its
member countries, can assist the navies in identifying Somali pirates,
and it can potentially support a decision by the navy to detain
suspects pending further investigations.88
2. Interaction with the shipping industry

Another important player in the fight against maritime piracy is
the private sector, including ship owners, operators, and insurance
companies.89 The role of shipping companies is particularly important
in the field of sharing information, since they have access to crucial
data and are also in a position to enable the collection of evidence by
the police.
Nonetheless, cooperation and information sharing between the
private sector and law enforcement bodies has not been seamless.
First, the shipping industry had to be sensitized to the importance of
post-incident reporting, preserving the crime scene for the purpose of
evidence gathering, and facilitating interviews with the crew of
hijacked ships.90 Thus, despite existing guidelines, it was not
uncommon to have cases where ships were thoroughly cleaned by
their crews immediately upon their release by the pirates and prior to
any law enforcement engagement, thereby destroying any potential
87.

A decision on sharing such information must also be taken in conformity
with all INTERPOL’s rules, notably with the RPD.

88.

See Greece to Prosecute First Maritime Piracy Case with Evidence
Gathered by INTERPOL Team, INTERPOL (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://www.interpol.int/fr/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2012/
PR098.

89.

St. Hilaire, supra note 73, at 2–3.

90.

BMP4, supra note 83, § 12. See also IMO, supra note 78, ¶¶ 6.7–6.9
(discussing the securing of evidence); S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 2,
pmbl. (underlining “the importance of continuing to enhance the
collection, preservation and transmission to competent authorities of
evidence of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia”). The UNSC further welcomed “the ongoing work of the IMO,
INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on
preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy, and noting the
importance for the successful prosecution of acts of piracy of enabling
seafarers to give evidence in criminal proceedings.” S.C. Res. 2077,
supra, note 2. In that resolution, the UNSC further urged states “to
make their citizens and vessels available for forensic investigation as
appropriate at the first suitable port of call immediately following an act
or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from
captivity.” Id. ¶ 29.

327

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013
Combating Maritime Piracy

crime scene investigation. Direct collaboration with shipping
companies proved that this hurdle can be overcome. For example,
following the release of the hijacked oil tanker Irene SL in April 2011,
INTERPOL immediately dispatched to the vessel an Incident
Response Team (IRT). The IRT, supported by the South African
Police Service, and in coordination with European Union Naval Force
(EU NAVFOR) and INTERTANKO, gathered evidence which later
served to assist Greece in its first prosecution of a piracy case.91 This
successful deployment paved the way for similar INTERPOL-led
IRTs, where crime scene evidence was collected and hostages were
debriefed following their release.92 In July 2013, INTERPOL also
carried out its first IRT mission on a ship that was attacked by
pirates operating in the Gulf of Guinea.
An additional difficulty concerns the trust gap between the
shipping industry and other entities, notably governmental authorities
such as navies and law enforcement agencies. This obstacle to
information sharing has been particularly relevant in reference to
ransom payments. Typically, negotiations over ransom payments are
conducted directly between the pirates or their representatives and
the shipping company or its representatives.93 In the context of such
negotiations, information of relevance for future investigation and
prosecution might be obtained, including names of negotiators and
phone numbers. Frequently, however, the shipping company
concerned has been hesitant to share such information with
governmental authorities. This may derive from an assessment that
the information may be business sensitive; an assumption that sharing
information might frustrate the on-going (or future) negotiations; or
even a fear of potential criminal proceedings against the
representatives of the shipping industry in countries where paying
ransom to pirates is criminalized. Overcoming this trust gap enabled
the population of international criminal databases with relevant
information to be used for future analytical reports and potential
prosecution of pirates’ kingpins. To maintain the positive momentum,
it is important that the private sector receive feedback on the
information it provides to governmental authorities so that it can
appreciate the effects of its collaboration.

91.

See Greece to Prosecute First Maritime Piracy Case with Evidence
Gathered by INTERPOL Team, supra note 88.

92.

As of July 2013, INTERPOL has carried out six more IRTs following
the release of ships hijacked by Somali pirates.

93.

See Vivienne Walt, Why the Somali Pirates Keep Getting Their
Ransoms, TIME (Apr. 20, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,1892366,00.html (noting how shipping companies
routinely conduct the negotiations with pirates and pay ransom sums).
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C. The Proliferation of Information Networks and Its Discontents

One of the marked developments on the international level in
recent decades is the proliferation of non-synchronized networks,
which contribute to the creation of a “new world order.”94 This
phenomenon was attributed to three core factors: technological
innovation that enables information exchange, the expansion of
domestic regulation, and the rise of globalization.95 The international
response to the surge in piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia and
in the Gulf of Guinea exemplifies the scope of this phenomenon.
Within a relatively short period of time, new institutions and
structures were promptly created to address the new threats and
specifically to facilitate the exchange of information. These included,
for example, the creation of an operational network under the
auspices of “The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction” (SHADE)
initiative96 and the establishment of three information sharing centers
under the Djibouti Code of Conduct.97
The proliferation of new information sharing networks raises a
number of challenges. First, it creates confusion as to which network
should be used and which entity should be approached in a particular
case. This problem is even more acute where the possessor of the
information, who wants to share it, is not accustomed to
communicating with entities from other disciplines—for example
where a private shipping company wishes to communicate information
to the navy or the police.
In addition, the abundance of networks frequently leads to two
extreme and problematic situations related to the circulation of an
item of information. One extreme is a case where an item is circulated
simultaneously in different networks, and consequently, users that are
connected to these networks receive the exact same item multiple
times. This duplication (or multiplication) of communication burdens
the information system and its users, and it wastes valuable resources.

94.

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 15 (2004).

95.

Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43
VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (2002).

96.

The SHADE initiative began in 2008 as a mechanism of meetings aimed
at coordinating and de-conflicting activities between the countries and
coalitions involved in military counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of
Aden and the western Indian Ocean. See generally Shared Awareness
and Deconfliction (SHADE), OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY, http://
oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/shared-awareness-and-deconflictionshade (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (containing more information on
SHADE).

97.

See Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra 56, art. 8(1) (describing the
centers established in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen).
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The opposite scenario is also quite common and is potentially
even riskier: it concerns the situation where networks operate in “close
circuit” and without coordination. This leads to valuable items of
information being lost due to the silo-style structure of the networks.
Such a situation can have harsh consequences where an item of
information circulated in one network is the missing piece in the
puzzle that entities connected to other networks are trying to put
together. This shortcoming was underscored by Pierre St. Hilaire,
Head of INTERPOL’s Maritime Piracy Taskforce:
There is a large volume of information on piracy networks that
is fragmented and in the possession of actors that have little
past experience of working together closely. For example,
information on piracy attacks and those responsible may be in
the possession of the military; complementary information on
the same attacks may be in the possession of the flag state, the
ship owner, local law enforcement, crew members and hostages,
and the private actors conducting the ransom negotiations.98

Mr. St. Hilaire added, “[p]oor communication among ship owners,
navies, and law enforcement agencies means that it has been difficult
to develop complete pictures of what happens in pirate attacks.”99
One suggested solution is to centralize the flow of information
through the creation of a single information sharing mechanism.100
This mechanism should be comprised of two layers. The first layer
would be on the national level, where each country should designate a
single point of contact to facilitate domestic inter-agency
coordination,101 as well as communication with external stakeholders.
Such designation of “central authorities” has become standard
practice in matters concerning international cooperation in criminal
matters,102 and it has been proven to be efficient in preventing
98.

St. Hilaire, supra note 73, at 3.

99.

Id. at 2 n.2.

100. See id. at 3 (“The ultimate goal is to collect and centralize this
information for use by the law enforcement community.”).
101. On the importance of coordination on the domestic level, see generally
Brian Wilson, Reshaping Maritime Security Cooperation: The
Importance of Interagency Coordination at the National Level, in
MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra note 41, at
202 (“In this context [of Somali piracy], cooperation between states is
crucial. Recent efforts to repress piracy also demonstrate that
cooperation within each state is equally crucial. Maritime security
operations may involve extensive cooperation and coordination between
different governmental agencies if they are to succeed.”).
102. See supra notes 56, 57 and accompanying text (regarding the central
information sharing centers discussed in the Djibouti and Gulf of Guinea
Codes of Conduct). See also Article 32 of INTERPOL’s Constitution,
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duplication of work, overcoming language barriers, and establishing
informal personal relationships. Such informal personal relationships
are often a key factor in facilitating effective and timely international
cooperation. Along this line, Working Group 5, created in
October 2011 under the auspices of the Contact Group on Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia and focused on the investigation of financial
flows related to piracy,103 recommended “the adoption of a single point
of contact in each country to strengthen the domestic coordination
process and to facilitate liaison with the private sector.”104
Similarly, on the second layer, namely on the international level, a
single empowered international mechanism—a “one stop shop”—
should be identified. This mechanism need not be created based on
hierarchical structure vis-à-vis states and other contributing entities;
rather, it should serve as an end-point and coordinator of all
information sharing operations. With regard to communication
regarding financial flows, Working Group 5 identified INTERPOL as
“the main international single point of contact with the shipping
industry for information-sharing to boost the international
community’s ability to identify, locate and prosecute pirates and their
organizers and financiers.”105
Where information centers and networks have already been
created, and identifying a single point of contact among them is not
feasible, consideration should be given to integrating their work
through applying an interoperability paradigm, namely identifying
according to which each member country appoints a body which will
serve as the National Central Bureau (NCB). The NCB ensures liaison
with: (1) the various departments in the country; (2) those bodies in
other countries serving as National Central Bureaus; and (3) the
Organization’s General Secretariat. See INTERPOL, supra note 85,
art. 32. See also conventions adopted under the auspices of the U.N.,
where, for the purpose of ensuring coordinated cooperation (for example,
with regard to executing requests for mutual legal assistance) the
conventions require each state party to designate a central authority.
See, e.g., Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art.
18.13, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000).
103. See Working Group 5, CGPCS, http://www.thecgpcs.org/work.do?
action=workAd (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (“Working Group 5, chaired
by Italy, focuses on how to advance information sharing internationally
and between industry and government authorities to disrupt the pirate
enterprise ashore, and works with other key partners such as
INTERPOL, national law enforcement/prosecution agencies currently
pursuing piracy investigations/prosecution, and the World Bank to
better understand how illicit financial flows associated with maritime
piracy are moving in the area.”).
104. See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 2020, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. S/2012/783 (Oct. 22,
2012).
105. Id.
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means to connect and synchronize the various existing networks,
thereby creating a “network of networks.”106 From a technical
perspective, this will ensure, for example, that a search in one system
will generate responses from all other inter-connected networks and
will therefore avoid the need to check each system individually.
Finally, the already existing international and regional structures
for sharing piracy-related information can generally provide adequate
support and meet the needs for information exchange. Accordingly,
prior to creating a new center or network in this field, it is
recommended that states carefully assess the added value in such an
undertaking and ensure that this would not in fact exacerbate the
already existing problems discussed above. Indeed, this cautious
approach was echoed in recent international instruments.107

VI. Conclusion
Maritime piracy has posed considerable risks to the international
community. A key component for successful counter-piracy
undertakings is international cooperation among states, international
and regional organizations, and the private sector. The legal basis for
international cooperation is moored in various international
instruments, as well as in general principles of international law. It
requires states to adhere to due diligence “best efforts” standards,
which, in the context of maritime piracy, entail exercising sincere,
concerted and proactive efforts.
Sharing information is one of the specific duties within the general
duty to cooperate. It should therefore lead to a regular exchange of
relevant data among all actors involved. Restrictions based on
national security and classification rules should be applied only on an
exceptional basis.
The implementation of a strategic partnership based on an
interdisciplinary paradigm is not without difficulties, particularly in
the field of information exchange and in light of the fact that the
106. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 94, at 135 (“The best way to integrate the
various governments networks . . . into a more recognizable structure of
world order is to create networks of networks.”). See also id. ch. 4, pt. 1
(discussing this idea further).
107. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2039, supra note 4, ¶ 7 (encouraging “the States of
the Gulf of Guinea, ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC, to develop and
implement transnational and transregional maritime security
coordination centres covering the whole region of the Gulf of Guinea,
building on existing initiatives, such as those under the auspices of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO)” (emphasis added)); Gulf of
Guinea Code of Conduct, supra note 57, pmbl. (emphasizing “the
importance of building on existing national, regional and extraregional
initiatives to enhance maritime safety and security in the Gulf of
Guinea” (emphasis added)).
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primary actors—navies, law enforcement agencies, and the private
sector—are not accustomed to working together. Nevertheless,
through collaboration in recent years, many challenges have been
successfully met, and solutions that have not been part of the
traditional discourse in combating crimes were identified. To continue
and build on those accomplishments, it is paramount to centralize the
flow of information and to avoid the creation of new close-circuit
information networks.
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